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Pennsylvania's Doctrine of Necessities: An
Anachronism Demanding Abolishment
I. Introduction
The husband's duty to support his wife.., and the wife's
duty to render services to her husband ... are two of the most
ancient concepts of the common law ...
The very terms of these duties seem somewhat strange and
harsh to the ear. They may have some charm of apparent
antiquity, but they also cause a certain disquietude from their
seeming lack of adaptation to our present needs.'
Pennsylvania's common law doctrine of necessities has been
stated as follows:
A husband is under a legal duty to support his wife and
children, and where he neglects this duty, one who supplies
necessaries for their support may recover their cost in an action
under the common law, which raises an implied promise, on the
part of the husband, to pay.2
The passage of the Pennsylvania Equal Rights Amendment,3 with
its broad mandate of no gender-based legislation, has caused
Pennsylvania courts to question the continuing validity of the
doctrine of necessities. All Pennsylvania courts that have grappled
with this issue have determined that the Equal Rights Amendment
(ERA) renders this centuries old common law doctrine unconstitu-
tional.4 Therefore, the question that remains in dispute is whether
the doctrine of necessities can be modified to conform to the
1. Paul Sayre, A Reconsideration of Husband's Duty to Support and Wife's Duty to
Render Services, 29 VA. L. REV. 857, 857 (1943).
2. Gessler v. Gessler, 124 A.2d 502, 505 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1956). See also Adler v. Adler,
90 A.2d 389, 390 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1952).
3. See infra note 37.
4. See Albert Einstein Med. Ctr. v. Gold, 66 Pa. D. & C.2d 347 (Phila. Co. 1974);
Albert Einstein Med. Ctr. v. Nathans, 27 Fiduciary Rep. 561 (Phila. Co. 1977); Nan Duskin
v. Parks, 11 Pa. D. & C.3d 299 (Phila. Co. 1978); Park Ave. Hosp. v. Klees, 20 Pa. D. & C.3d
124 (Northumberland Co. 1981).
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mandates of the ERA, or whether the courts should abolish the
doctrine altogether.5
The social role of women and the institution of marriage have
undergone vast changes since the development of the doctrine.6
More often than not, both husband and wife work to contribute to
the household income.7 No longer do "women fall in the category
of those who require this financially protective doctrine, nor do all
men serve the function of sole provider."'  As a result, the
doctrine of necessities neither meets the needs of the modern
family nor recognizes the capabilities of today's woman.9
This Comment contends that the passage of the ERA coupled
with the changing marital roles of both men and women renders
the necessities doctrine and any subsequent modifications made by
Pennsylvania courts obsolete. Specifically, this Comment argues
that the premise for the doctrine's protective benefits no longer
exists; consequently, the courts should abolish the doctrine and its
current modifications. Part II explores the background of the
5. Two states, Virginia and Maryland, have judicially abolished their respective
doctrines of necessities. See discussion infra Part IV.
6. In contemporary marriages, assignment of support, housekeeping and childcare tasks
are tailored to each famil's needs and determined by individual abilities rather than by sex.
See Note, The Unnecessary Doctrine of Necessaries, 82 MicH. L. REV. 1767, 1796 n.141
(1984) [hereinafter Note]. For example, in Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142
(1980), Justice Stevens, in a concurring opinion noted that three types of support
arrangements now exist within marriage: "(1) those in which the husband is dependent on
the wife; (2) those in which the wife is dependent on the husband; and (3) those in which
neither spouse is dependent on the other." 446 U.S. at 154 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
7. The following statistics are indicative of the growing changes in the economics of
family life:
[In] 1988, 52 percent of all married women with children under the age of one
were in the labor force. In fact, married women with preschool children represent
the fastest growing category of workers in the U.S. economy. In 1989, only 22%
of U.S. husband-wife families had the husband/father as the sole breadwinner in
keeping with the traditional image of the nuclear family, while 49 percent had both
partners working.
JOAN HOFF, LAW GENDER AND INJUSTICE 289 (1991).
However, statistics do recognize that men and women are not yet economically equal.
For example, in the fourth quarter of 1991, women who worked full-time had median
earnings of $375/week compared to $503/week for men who worked full time. Weekly
Earnings Increased 3.3percent for Wage, Salary Workers in 1991, 24 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA),
at B4 (Feb. 5, 1992).
8. Mary Elizabeth Borja, Comment, Functions of Womanhood: The Doctrine of
Necessaries in florida, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 397, 418 (1992).
9. One scholar recently criticized Florida's retention of the necessities doctrine as
"fr[eezing] in time the role of women" and as represehtative of a longing for the "return to
a mythical past." Id. at 418.
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doctrine of necessities. Discussion focuses on the traditional roles
of husband and wife that were the mainstay underlying the
doctrine's development and the purposes that the doctrine sought
to achieve. Part III addresses the passage of the ERA in
Pennsylvania. This section details the amendment's subsequent
effect on other areas of domestic relations in Pennsylvania. This
discussion will illustrate that the ERA and the principles which it
endorses demand that the courts abolish any form of the necessities
doctrine. Part IV details the various options available to
Pennsylvania courts regarding modification of the doctrine and
describes the advantages and disadvantages of each approach. Part
V outlines the path, albeit ambivalent and crooked, taken thus far
by the Pennsylvania courts regarding how to modify the doctrine.
Finally, Part VI explains why abolition of the necessities doctrine
is the only way to insure that both the needs of the family and the
mandate of the ERA are met.
II. Pennsylvania's Doctrine of Necessities
To fully understand the common law doctrine of necessities,
one must first examine the roles of the husband and wife within the
doctrine; that is, the husband's duty to support and the wife's duty
to provide services. In addition, a definition of what constitutes
"necessities" provides insight as to how the doctrine was used to
aid "needy" wives. Finally, an exploration of the rationale behind
the doctrine reveals that its common law purpose is no longer
relevant to the modern family's needs.
A. Husband's Duty to Support
At common law, the husband and wife were considered one
legal entity; their two identities merged upon marriage so that the
husband's identity subsumed that of the wife.1" The husband had
a duty to maintain and support his wife with the necessities of
life." This duty of support included the cost of necessaries
provided to his wife by third parties.12 This concept, the doctrine
of necessities, has thus been stated:
10. See 41 AM. JuR. 2D Husband and Wife § 2 (1995). Jay M. Zitter, Annotation,
Necessity in Action Against Husband for Necessaries Furnished Wife, of Proving Husband's





A husband is under a legal duty to support his wife and
children, and where he neglects this duty, one who supplies
necessaries for their support may recover their cost in an action
under the common law, which raises an implied promise, on the
part of the husband, to pay. 3
According to the doctrine, the husband was responsible directly to
the merchant who supplied the goods to the wife or child.14
Theoretically, a merchant would be induced to sell necessities to a
married woman knowing that should the husband decline to pay,
the law would imply a contract between the seller of goods and the
husband. 5
The vendor could collect from the husband on a contract
implied by law only by demonstrating the fulfillment of several
conditions. 6 The courts generally imposed three conditions
before allowing recovery under the doctrine of necessities: (1) the
items purchased must have been "necessaries;" (2) the wife must
have been living with the husband at the time of the wife's
purchase or have been separated through no fault of her own; and
(3) the husband's credit must have been relied upon by the
merchant. 7
B. The Wife's Duty to Render Services
In return for the husband's duty to provide for her necessities,
the wife had the reciprocal obligation of domestic services,
consortium and taking care of the children. 8 Thus, the wife's
marital duties were consideration for the husband's obligation. 9
Under the doctrine, however, the wife had no reciprocal obligation
to a third party to provide necessities to her husband.' As a
13. Gessler v. Gessler, 124 A.2d 502, 505 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1956). See also Adler v. Adler,
90 A.2d 389, 391 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1952).
14. HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMEsTIc RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 265 (Hornbook Series, Student Edition 2d ed. 1988).
15. Note, supra note 6, at 1772.
16. Id. at 1767 & n.5.
17. Id. "The purpose of the cohabitation requirement was to insure that the husband
was treated fairly. By wrongfully deserting him, the wife destroyed the contractual quid pro
quo of his support duty-her household services-as well as the moral basis of his obligation,
her fidelity." Id. at 1773 n.17.
18. Note, supra note 6, at 1772.
19. Debra S. Betteridge, Note, Inequality in Marital Liabilities: The Need for Equal
Protection When Modifying the Necessaries Doctrine, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 43, 44 n.4 (1983).
20. Borja, supra note 8, at 398.
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result, the wife could not be held liable for necessities furnished to
her family.2"
C. Defining Necessities
Originally, the common law defined necessities to mean only
basic items of sustenance such as food, drink, clothing and
shelter.22 In many states, however, including Pennsylvania, the
definition of necessities expanded to include all things necessary
and suitable according to the husband's "rank, position, fortune,
earning capacity and mode of living."'  Thus, necessities was a
relative term that varied with context.24
D. Purpose
Historically, the purpose of the doctrine of necessities was to
provide "needy" wives with necessary goods and services.' Thus,
the doctrine was a means of enforcing a husband's duty to support
his wife during an ongoing marriage.26 The basis of this duty
originated from the feudal-medieval concept that, as the head of
the family, the husband was responsible for the needs of those
depended on him to provide life's necessities.
27
1. Doctrine of Coverture.-The doctrine of necessities was a
direct result of a married woman's position at common law: an era
21. CLARK, supra note 14, at 250.
22. Betteridge, supra note 19, at 43 n.l.
23. For example, in Reichman v. Hervitz, 66 Dauphin County Rep. 399 (1954), the
Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas held that whether the wife's furs were necessaries
or luxuries was a question of fact rather than law to be determined according to the
husband's earning capacity and mode of living.
24. For example, because the standard of whether a woman was considered "needy"
varied according to the husband's lifestyle and ability to pay, a wealthy woman might be
considered "needy" if she lacked caviar, a poor one if she lacked gruel. Note, supra note 6,
at 1784.
25. See Marshfield Clinic v. Discher, 314 N.W.2d 326, 328 (Wis. 1982) ("The heart of
this common law rule is a concern for the support and the sustenance of the family and the
individual members thereof .... The necessaries rule encourages the extension of credit to
those who in an individual capacity may not have the ability to make these basic
purchases.").
26. CLARK, supra note 14, at 265. Scholars have criticized whether the doctrine
effectively achieved its stated purpose of providing marital support. Often merchants could
not ascertain at the time of purchase whether the requisite conditions were met. These
uncertainties of collection discouraged merchants from providing credit to needy spouses.
Note, supra note 6, at 1767.
27. Park Ave. Hosp. v. Klees, 20 Pa. D. & C.3d 124, 129 (Northumberland Co. 1981).
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when a married woman could not control her own property or
income, and, could not contract on her own. 8 The theoretical
basis for the married woman's loss of legal rights was the feudal
doctrine of coverture; that is, the unity of husband and wife.29
Coverture resulted in a loss of both substantive and procedural
rights for a woman.
Substantively, she lost control and management of her real
property to her husband .... All of her chattels she owned at
the time of marriage and those she acquired later became [her
husband's absolutely]. . . . [A]s a result of her marriage a
woman lost her power to transfer her own real property by an
ordinary conveyance and ... to contract with either her
husband or third parties .... Procedurally, . . . wives could
neither sue nor be sued at law unless they were joined with
their husband."
In short, the doctrine of necessities was a recognition by the courts
of the limited economic potential that a married woman once
possessed. 1
2. Married Women's Property Acts.-During the 1800s, in an
attempt to free women from the coverture doctrine, most states,
including Pennsylvania, passed some form of the Married Women's
Property Act.32 The aim of these acts was to "eliminate the basic
injustices of the common law rules governing the property rights of
married women 33 and to emancipate women from the constraints
of coverture a However, while the Married Women's Property
Acts altered the legal rights of women, the acts did virtually
28. Note, supra note 6, at 1770-71.
29. William Blackstone described the doctrine as follows: "By marriage, the husband
and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is
suspended during the marriage .... " See, 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 430
(facsimile reprint 1979) (1765).
30. LEO KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW: THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 36 (1969).
31. "An overbearing cycle of successive pregnancies, births, and child-rearing and [the
wife's] physical handicaps, in a machineless age that depended on muscular labor, made her
unavailable for work outside the home." Park Ave. Hosp., 20 Pa. D. & C.3d at 129.
32. KANOWrrZ, supra note 30, at 40. Pennsylvania's Married Woman's Property Act
read, in part, as follows: "Hereafter a married woman may sue and be sued civilly -in all
respects and in any form of action, and with the same effect and results and consequences
as an unmarried person .... " Act of June 8, 1893, ch. 284, § 3, 1893 PA. LAWS 344, 345
(repealed 1985).
33. KANOWrrZ, supra note 30, at 59.
34. Borja, supra note 8, at 401.
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nothing to mitigate the duty of a husband to provide support for
his wife."
3. Current Conditions.-The changing social and family
conditions have rendered the purpose behind the doctrine of
necessities obsolete. The Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia
commented on the antiquity of the doctrine as follows:
These common law conditions no longer prevail. Technological
developments have minimized the woman's physical handicaps
and considerably alleviated the tedious chores of the home.
Medical and scientific advances which have increased both
production and population, and reduced infant mortality and
increased longevity, have made birth control a desirable social
objective, and have been factors liberating her from the
common law requirements that tethered her to her husband and
her husband's home. In two world wars she has proven her
ability to do what was formerly considered to be a man's job.36
Thus, the premise and the purpose behind the necessities doctrine
no longer exists. Consequently, the doctrine of necessities is out of
step with the needs of modern society.
III. Pennsylvania's Equal Rights Amendment
The passage of the Equal Rights Amendment called into
question the validity of the doctrine of necessities. An examination
of how the Pennsylvania courts have applied the ERA in other
areas of domestic relations will provide guidance regarding how the
amendment should affect the necessities doctrine. The following
analysis will show how the courts have used the ERA in these
areas of domestic relations to both extend rights to and impose
burdens on women. However, an examination of these cases
reveals that the ERA does not require an extension of the
necessities doctrine to impose a reciprocal liability on the wife for
the necessities of her husband. These cases, which illustrate the
purpose behind the ERA and the aims that it sought to achieve,
35. Id. at 402. In Pennsylvania, the Married Women's Property Act did not affect the
doctrine of necessities; consequently, the husband still had a duty to provide necessities to
his family. See Adler v. Adler, 90 A.2d 389 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1952) (holding that where
deserted wife used her estate in the discharge of obligation owed primarily by husband, the
law will impose a quasi-contractual relationship on husband to reimburse the wife for costs
she had expended from her own estate in providing support for herself).
36. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr. v. Nathans, 27 Fiduciary Rep. 561, 565 (Phila. Co. 1977).
1996]
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reveal that abolishing, rather than extending, the necessities
doctrine would be in accordance with the ERA's mandate.
In 1971 Pennsylvania became the first state to amend its
constitution to include an equal rights amendment.3 1 The imple-
mentation of a state ERA was viewed as an "effective and
expeditious" means to prevent the future enactment of discrimi-
natory state legislation and to erase the many instances of sex-
based classification in existing state laws.38  Proponents of the
ERA ultimately viewed the amendment as a step toward the
equality of men and women, socially as well as legally.
3 9
Within three years of the amendment, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court provided case law signaling that it would interpret
the ERA to mean that no distinction may be made under the law
of Pennsylvania based solely on gender.4  In Henderson v.
Henderson," the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated the amend-
ment's purpose and effect in the following definitive terms:
The thrust of the Equal Rights Amendment is to insure equality
of rights under the law and to eliminate sex as a basis for
distinction. The sex of citizens of this Commonwealth is no
longer a permissible factor in the determination of their legal
rights and legal responsibilities. The law will not impose
different benefits or different burdens upon the members of a
society based on the fact that they may be man or woman.42
In accordance with the above principle, Pennsylvania courts have
imposed reciprocal rights and burdens on both genders when
applying the amendment to common law rules based on sex.43
37. Bartholomew v. Foster, 541 A.2d 393, 395 n.3 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988) (The court,
quoting from R. WOODSIDE, PENNSYLVANIA CONSTrrUTIONAL LAw 193 (1985), notes that
"[s]ome territories, including Wyoming and Utah, wrote equal rights provisions into their
constitutions before they became states."). The amendment reads as follows: "Equality of
rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
because of the sex of the individual." PA. CONST. art. I, § 28.
38. Margaret K. Krasik, Comment, A Review of the Implementation of the Pennsylvania
Equal Rights Amendment, 14 Duo. L. REV. 683, 685 (1976).
39. Id. at 686.
40. Phyllis W. Beck and Joanne A. Baker, An Analysis of the Impact of the Pennsylvania
Equal Rights Amendment, 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 743, 745 (1994).
41. 327 A.2d 60 (Pa. 1974).
42. Id. at 62.
43. See part II, §§ A-D (discussing the effect of the ERA on alimony pendente lite, child
support, consortium and marital property).
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A. Alimony Pendente Lite
In Henderson, the supreme court held that the former statutory
provision allowing the payment of alimony pendente lite, counsel
fees and expenses to the wife in a divorce action but not to the
husband was invalid as violative of the ERA.' The court rea-
soned that since the amendment was intended to eliminate sex as
a basis for classification, where the law provides a support remedy
for the wife, it must provide one for the husband.45 The legisla-
tive reaction to the pending case was to "sex neutralize" the
statute.46
B. Child Support
Prior to the passage of the ERA, the Pennsylvania courts had
held that the primary duty to support minor children rested with
the father.47  However, in Conway v. Dana," the supreme court
abolished this presumption and held that parents have equal
responsibility for child support according to their capacities.49 The
court determined that the presumption was "clearly a vestige of the
past and incompatible with the present recognition of equality of
the sexes."5 The court supported its decision with two concepts:
the welfare of the child and the economic capabilities of the
mother.51 Thus, due to the Conway decision and the ERA,
44. Henderson, 327 A.2d at 62.
45. Id.
46. Before this issue reached the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the legislature amended
the alimony pendente lite statute to conform to the ERA. The words "wife," "husband,"
and "ex-wife" were deleted and replaced with "spouse" and "ex-spouse." See Act of June
27, 1974, ch. 139, sec. 1, § 46, 1974 Pa. Laws 403, 403 (1974) (amending 23 PA. STAT. ANN.
§ 46).
47. See Commw. ex rel. Bortz v. Norris, 135 A.2d 771, 773 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1957);
Commw. ex rel. Kreiner v. Scheidt, 277, 131 A.2d 147, 148 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1957); Commw.
ex rel. Silverman v. Silverman, 117 A.2d 801, 802 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1955).
48. 318 A.2d 324 (Pa. 1974).
49. Id. at 326.
50. Id. The court further stated that "[tihe law must not be reluctant to remain abreast
with the developments of society and should unhesitatingly discard former doctrines that
embody concepts that have since been discredited." Id.
51. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained as follows:
In the matter of child support we have always expressed as the primary
purpose the best interest and welfare of the child. This purpose is not fostered by
indulging in a fiction that the father is necessarily the best [sic] provider and that
the mother is incapable, because of her sex, of offering a contribution to the
fulfillment of this aspect of the parental obligation.
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Pennsylvania courts have been more aware of the need to look at
the relative resources available to both mother and father when
determining the adequacy of child support orders.
52
C. Consortium
At common law, only the husband could recover for the loss
of consortium.53  However, in Hopkins v. Blanco,54  the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a reciprocal right should
inhere in the wife for loss of the husband's consortium. In its
reasoning, the court recalled that the premise behind the common
law action of loss of consortium was that the wife was the equiva-
lent of a chattel of her husband.56 The status of the wife was
similar to that of a servant; consequently, "the husband technically
owned her."57  The court explicitly rejected this premise and
endorsed the purpose behind the ERA: that in the modern world,
women and men must enjoy equal status.58 Thus, since the wife
is the husband's equal, no valid justification exists for treating the
two differently in matters relating to the marital relationship.59
D. Marital Property
At common law, the husband was presumed to be the owner
of all goods in the spouses' joint possession. 6  In DiFlorido v.
DiFlorido,61 the supreme court ruled that in future cases regarding
ownership of household goods, the presumption must be that
property acquired in anticipation of, or during marriage, and
possessed and used by both spouses, is held as entireties proper-
Id.
52. Krasik, supra note 38, at 701. See also Commw. ex. rel. Buonocore v. Buonocore,
340 A.2d 579 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975) (upholding a support order of thirty dollars per week
against a wife when the minor children were residing with the husband); Kaper v. Kaper, 323
A.2d 222 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1974) (remanding to trial court to consider support order directing
father to pay child support in light of ERA, as well as mother's income and relevant needs
of child).
53. See Hopkins v. Blanco, 320 A.2d 139, 140 (Pa. 1974).
54. 320 A.2d 139 (Pa. 1974).
55. Id. at 141.
56. Id. at 140-41.
57. Id. at 140.
58. Id.
59. Hopkins, 320 A.2d at 140.
60. DiFlorido v. DiFlorido, 331 A.2d 174, 178-79 (Pa. 1975).
61. 331 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1975).
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ty.62 In its reasoning, the court recognized that the husband is not
necessarily the sole provider.63 The court further noted that even
when the husband is the sole provider, most likely both spouses
"have contributed in some way to the acquisition and/or upkeep of,
and that both spouses intend to benefit by the use of, the goods
and furnishings in the household."'  Thus, in accordance with the
ERA, the DiFlorido court invalidated the common law presump-
tion that the man is the sole provider of the household.
Scholars have called the Pennsylvania courts' approach of
taking burdens previously imposed on the husband and imposing
them on the wife as the "reciprocal rights" test.6 Simply put, this
reciprocity test is an overt choice by the courts to equalize the
status of husbands and wives rather than to invalidate a statute.66
Equalization, therefore, is obtained not by extending any specific
right or remedy to a husband but by interpreting the contested law
as non-discriminatory on the whole.67 Two reasons exist for this
approach: (1) courts have hesitated to go beyond construction and
to rewrite the language of the statute; and (2) the courts have
feared that striking down an entire statutory provision would lead
to unwanted social effects and would place the institution of the
family in danger.68 Thus, the reciprocity test represents a solution
to the courts' dilemma of what to do in order to conform an old
law to a new social mandate.69
While the reciprocity approach realizes the ERA mandate in
certain areas, an extension of rights and duties is not the proper
road to follow with regard to the doctrine of necessities. The areas
discussed above-alimony pendente lite, child support, consortium
and marital property--did not impose a burden on the wife where
none previously existed.7" However, extending a burden on the
wife for her husband's necessities would create a liability where the
wife previously did not have one.
62. Id. at 180.
63. Id. at 179.
64. Id.
65. See Krasik, supra note 38, at 699.
66. Id. at 699-700.
67. Id. at 700.
68. Id. at 699.
69. For example, in order for most of the support statutes to conform to the ERA only
the words "wife" and "husband" would need to be changed to "spouse." Id. at 699.
70. See discussion supra Part II, §§ A-D.
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IV. Three Approaches to Modifying Pennsylvania's Doctrine of
Necessities
This section examines three basic modifications or approaches
that various state courts or state legislatures have used to accom-
modate their respective doctrines of necessity with recent social
conditions. As previously stated, because numerous wives are not
dependent upon their husbands for support, the courts can no
longer presume a need to provide wives with financial protec-
tion.7 A substantial number of married women work outside the
home and contribute along with their husbands to family resourc-
es." The changing marital roles in American society, along with
the growing recognition that the law requires the equal treatment
of both sexes, has led most courts and legislatures to address the
continued validity of the common law doctrine of necessities.
73
All of the courts that have examined the continued validity of the
necessities doctrine have held that wives are to some degree
responsible for their credit purchases. The courts have done this
either by modernizing the necessities doctrine or by abolishing it
altogether.74
A. Joint and Several Liability
The most frequent modification has been to enlarge the
doctrine of necessities by applying it equally to both the husband
and the wife.75 This approach causes both the husband and the
wife to be jointly and severally liable for the necessary expenses of
the other.76  This modification has generally been imposed by
71. Betteridge, supra note 19, at 46.
72. HOFF, supra note 7, at 46.
Married women with children work an average of twenty years at full- or part-time
jobs; those without children, an average of thirty-five years. The most rapid
employment increase occurred among married women in the 1970s. In that
decade, they surpassed the number of single working women. In the process, the
number of working mothers increased by a stunning 500 percent between 1940 and
1978.
Id.; see Betteridge, supra note 19, at 46.
73. Betteridge, supra note 19, at 46.
74. Note, supra note 6, at 1775.
75. Marcus L. Moxley, Survey, North Carolina Baptist Hospitals, Inc. v. Harris: North
Carolina Adopts a Gender-Neutral Approach to the Doctrine of Necessaries, 66 N.C. L. REV.
1241, 1246 (1988) (examining the doctrine in the context of medical expenses).
76. Id.
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statute and appears primarily in states that have adopted an equal
rights amendment.
77
The positive aspect of this modification is that it is gender
neutral.78  This gender neutral approach is also procreditor
because it affords a creditor complete choice in collecting a debt by
allowing the creditor to collect payment from either spouse.
79
Creditors, therefore, have a greater degree of security because this
modification allows them to reach the assets of either or both
spouses.80 Reasons supporting this modification have also includ-
ed the improved economic position of women8' and the marital
status itself.'
However, this approach fails to consider which spouse actually
incurs the debt,83 and it tends to ignore the reality that spouses
differ in their ability to pay for necessaries.' Moreover, extension
of the doctrine may achieve "equality with a vengeance" by
creating liability in each spouse for the debts of another. 5 Such
a rule also establishes relatively rigid marital economic relation-
77. These statutes have generally been of two types: Family Expense Acts held to
include necessaries, see COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-6-110 (1987); ILL REV. STAT. ch. 40, para.
1015 (1979); IOWA CODE ANN. § 597.14 (West 1996); WASH. REV. CODE § 26-16-205 (1986);
and statutes that were enacted to deal specifically with the question of necessities, see HAW.
REV. STAT. § 572-24 (1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-2-102 (1981). Some states have
adopted this modification judicially. See Cooke v. Adams, 183 So. 2d 925 (Miss. 1986).
78. In other words, these classifications do not provide for the different treatment of
males and females on the basis of gender.
79. Moxley, supra note 75, at 1246-47.
80. Borja, supra note 8, at 426.
81. See Manatee Convalescent Ctr., Inc. v. McDonald, 392 So. 2d 1356, 1358 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1980) ("[E]ven handed treatment of the sexes in the modem market place must
carry the burden of responsibility which goes with the benefits.").
82. Parkway Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. Stem, 400 So. 2d 166, 167 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
("Our holding is that a wife is liable for her husband's bills simply and solely because of the
marital relationship between them.").
83. See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Hahaj, 430 N.E.2d 412,416 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982); Jersey
Shore Med. Ctr. v. Estate of Baum, 417 A.2d 1003, 1009 (N.J. 1980); Marshfield Clinic v.
Discher, 314 N.W.2d 326, 330 (Wis. 1982).
84. Mark S. Brennan, The New Doctrine of Necessaries in Virginia 19 U. RICH. L. REV.
317, 327 (1985).
85. In Jersey Shore Med. Ctr. v. Estate of Baum, 417 A.2d 1003 (N.J. 1980), the New
Jersey Supreme Court declined to extend the common law rule to require each spouse to be
completely liable for the other's necessaries, terming such a solution "equality with a
vengeance" because it would result in the immediate exposure of the property of one spouse
for a debt created by the other spouse. This would afford the creditor "the same benefits
as if [the] spouses had agreed to joint liability." The court further stated that "[nleither
equity nor reality justifies imposing unqualified liability on one spouse for the debts of the
other . i..." Id. at 1009.
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ships. Under such a rule couples are prevented from deciding
which partner will provide financial support, or in what proportion
each spouse will contribute support.86
On a superficial level, the interest that married couples have
in dividing support obligations between themselves may seem to be
merely an economic one.87  However, the implications of this
allocation stretch beyond the realm of simple family economics.88
"Freedom to select support roles also permits self-definition
according to deep personal needs and beliefs."89  Finally, the
manner in which spouses apportion their support obligations
expresses their values to their children.9"
In response to the above criticism, scholars have argued that
extension of the doctrine is not really "equality with a vengeance."
To avoid such a result, the doctrine can extend to both spouses
through liability on the part of either spouse for the necessary
expenses of the other spouse in proportion to which each has
contributed financially.91 This approach, which allows the courts
to take a case-by-case look at the income contributions of either
spouse, preserves the freedom of the couple to formulate its own
financial plan and to allocate household duties and income
producing work.92
86. Note, supra note 6, at 1795.
87. Id. at 1795-96.
88. Id. at 1796.
89. Id. The author further asserted that "[t]he self-image of one spouse may require
that he cast himself primarily as a financial provider, while that of another may demand that
he be a homemaker, and that of yet another may insist that he do a bit of both." Id. at 1796
ni.141. See also id. at 1796 n.141.
90. Id.
Parents both want and are obliged to instruct their offspring in the moral and
social principles that they believe are right. Through the example of their
marriage, parents teach their children about intimate relationships and the
appropriate social roles of men and women. Consequently, parents have a
powerful interest in structuring their support obligations in accordance with their
personal values.
Id. at 1796-97 (footnote omitted).
91. Borja, supra note 8, at 426.
92. Id. at 426-27. Moreover, because this extension of the doctrine would not impose
a greater financial liability than the monetary proportion each spouse contributes, the
doctrine would not place an undue burden on the resources of a spouse who performs more
household services and produces less monetary income. Id. at 426.
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B. Debt-Incurring Spouse Primarily Liable
Some courts, including several Pennsylvania courts,93 have
imposed primary liability on the spouse who incurred the necessary
expense and secondary liability on the spouse who did not.94 This
approach seeks to expand the doctrine of necessities but limits a
creditor's right to pursue a claim against both spouses jointly and
severally.95 This approach is also gender neutral and takes into
account which spouse incurred the debt.96 Thus, this modification
protects the nondebtor spouse.97
The Indiana Court of Appeals has endorsed this approach.98
The court provided the following two reasons for its modification:
(1) the changing role of the married woman and the marital
relationship99 and (2) the characterization of the modem marriage
as a financial unit in which either spouse is liable for his or her own
medical expenses, with the other spouse and the marital property
secondarily liable."°
The New Jersey Supreme Court provided similar reasons for
its modification."' 1 By applying the doctrine in a gender neutral
93. See infra note 125.
94. See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. Inc. v. Hahaj, 430 N.E.2d 412 (Ind. App. 1982); Jersey
Shore Med. Ctr. v. Estate of Baum, 417 A.2d 1003 (N.J. 1980).
95. Moxley, supra note 75, at 1241.
96. Id. at 1242-43.
97. Id. at 1241. The New Jersey Supreme Court addressed the need for limitations on
a creditor's right to pursue the debt of marital partners:
Normally, a person is not liable for the debt of another in the absence of an
agreement. The imposition of liability based on marital status alone is an
exception to that rule. Nonetheless, it is a justifiable exception. The reasonable
expectations of marital partners are that their income and assets are held for the
benefit of the marital partnership and, incidentally, for creditors who provide
necessaries for either spouse. However, it would be unfair to accord the same
rights to a creditor who provides necessaries on the basis of an agreement with
one spouse as to a creditor who has an agreement with both spouses. In the
absence of such an agreement, a creditor should have recourse to the property of
both spouses only where the financial resources of the spouse who incurred the
necessary expense are insufficient. Marshalling the marital resources in that
manner grants some protection to a spouse who has not expressly consented to
that debt.
Baum, 417 A.2d at 1010.
98. Memorial Hosp., 430 N.E.2d 412 (Ind. App. 1982)(holding wife primarily liable and
husband secondarily liable for medical expenses incurred by the wife).
99. Id. at 416.
100. Id. at 415.
101. See Baum, 417 A.2d at 1003.
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fashion, the court recognized the modern role of women in the
workforce and marriage as an integral part of a single financial
unit." The court also reasoned that the statistics indicating the
financial dependence of some wives on their husbands were
"insufficient reason" to leave the gender-based classification
undisturbed when balanced against a doctrine which "denigrates
the efforts of women who contribute to the finances of their
families and denies equal protection to husbands."1"
This modification, however, has several shortcomings. First, it
can be used to circumvent the statutory protection created by a
tenancy by the entirety: protection of a surviving spouse from her
deceased husband's creditors."° Second, the modification perpet-
uates an archaic doctrine by ignoring other legal venues available
to a creditor. For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated
that its modification is legitimate because "[a] necessary expense
incurred by one spouse benefits both.""5 However, if nonpurcha-
sing spouses enjoy actual benefit from their mates' acquisitions, the
creditor does not need the doctrine of necessities. Rather, he can
collect under the doctrine of unjust enrichment." Third, this
modification may "discourage a spouse from incurring 'necessary'
debts, especially those items from which he or she would not
personally benefit, such as child care costs."" This heavy incen-
tive to neglect basic household obligations is an affront to the
policy rationale that supports the doctrine of necessities' °8
102. Id. at 1009. "The common law must adapt to the progress of women in achieving
economic equality and to the mutual sharing of all obligations by husbands and wives." Id.
103. Id. at 1008.
104. Creditors can use the modification to circumvent the tenancy by the entirety
problem:
Although the Jersey Shore court gave its new rule prospective application, thus
freeing the instant defendant, Mrs. Baum, from liability from the costs of her
husband's last illness .. , the potential harshness of the rule may by illustrated by
considering how it would have affected Mrs. Baum had it been applied retroac-
tively. She would have lost all of her equity... in her only asset, her home, which
she had owned in tenancy by the entirety with her deceased husband. This severe
result would circumvent the legislative purpose behind tenancy by en-
tirety-protection of the surviving spouse from his or her dead mate's creditors.
Note, supra note 6, at 1780 n.59.
105. Baum, 417 A.2d at 1009.
106. Note, supra note 6, at 1791.
107. Borda, supra note 8, at 428.
108. Id.
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Finally, courts advocating this modification incorrectly
analogize marriage to a commercial partnership' t 9  In most
states, including Pennsylvania, marital property is owned separate-
ly.110 When marital property is owned separately, neither spouse
has a legal interest in the income or assets of the other."' 1
However, this modification "transforms the status of marital
property with respect to creditors from separately owned to, in
practical effect, communally owned." ' This patchwork system
of "community property" causes the unfair treatment of spouses.
Such a system imposes on spouses a liability for each other's debts
without bestowing upon them any of the benefits, such as a legally
defined share in one another's incomes.
113
The appropriateness of this partnership analogy is also
questionable. The usual goal of a partnership is profit. Marriage,
however, comprises more than economics. In our modem society
the most widely recognized purposes of marriage are "self-realiza-
tion, personal growth, and achievement of happiness through an
intimate relationship.,
1 1 4
C. Primary Liability on the Husband
The third modification provides that a husband is always
primarily liable and a wife always secondarily liable for all debts for
necessaries incurred by either spouse. At least five states have
adopted this view either by statute or judicial decree." 5 This
modification differs from others because it continues the common
109. See Baum, 417 A.2d at 1008 ("A modem marriage is a partnership, with neither
spouse necessarily dependent financially on the other.").
110. As of 1983, forty-two states have separate marital property systems. The states that
lack such systems are: Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas
and Washington. Note, supra note 6, at 1792 n.118.
111. Id. at 1792.
112. Id. at 1792 (emphasis omitted). See also Baum, 417 A.2d at 1010 ("A creditor
providing necessaries to one spouse can assume that the financial resources of both spouses
are available for payment.").
113. Note, supra note 6, at 1792.
114. Id. at 1793. Moreover, in Griswold v. Connecticut, the United States Supreme Court
also defined marriage as significantly more than an economic partnership stating: "[Marriage]
is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political
faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects." 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
115. Page v. Welfare Comm'r, 365 A.2d 1118 (Conn. 1976); Klump v. Klump, 121 N.E.2d
273 (Ohio Ct. App. 1954); Marshfield Clinic v. Discher, 314 N.W.2d 326 (Wis. 1982); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 42-201 (1978); OKLA. STAT. tit. 43, § 202 (1990).
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law practice of imposing an unequal share of financial responsibility
upon the husband.
Proponents of this approach rationalize that it comports with
the economic reality that in a typical household women do not
contribute an equal amount of income." 6 Proponents further
point out that women are not represented in the work force to the
same degree as men. Furthermore, a disparity of income exists
between men and women in the work force; women who are in the
work force do not earn as much as men."7 Thus, since most
women earn less than their spouses, advocates of this modification
believe it would be inequitable to impose comparable support
burdens on both spouses.
1 18
The shortcomings of this modification are significant. First,
when a wife is allowed to escape liability for the cost of her own
necessities, "the common law doctrine discriminates against the
husband under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."'' 9 "The means employed by the doctrine are not
substantially related to the goal of providing for needy spouses
because the doctrine fails to include needy husbands (under-
inclusive)," and it benefits non-needy wives (over-inclusive).12 °
Second, statistics also do not support the rationale behind this
modification. Although on the average women tend to earn less
than men, wives are not necessarily dependent on their husbands
and therefore are not necessarily needy. On the contrary, recent
statistics show that 59.4% of married women are members of the
labor force.121 Consequently, in at least 59.4% of all families, the
wife is at most only partially financially dependent upon her
husband.
Statistics thus show that the gender specification is no longer
useful or required. In actuality, this modification is demeaning and
dehumanizing to women as it labels them "dependent" and
"needy." This label does not fit modern wives. Consequently, this
modification does not aid women; rather, it stigmatizes them and
perpetuates traditional stereotypical views.
116. Bora, supra note 8, at 427.
117. See Marshfield Clinic, 314 N.W.2d at 329-30.
118. Borja, supra note 8, at 427.
119. Brennan, supra note 84, at 322.
120. Id.
121. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 401
(1994).
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V. Pennsylvania's Approach
No Pennsylvania appellate court has decided whether the ERA
abolishes, modifies or extends the doctrine of necessities.122 The
lower courts that have addressed this issue have either abolished
the doctrine or modified it." Thus, the current state of the law,
if not completely uncertain, is at least ambivalent. Certainty in this
area is necessary for two reasons. First, a precise rule would give
creditors reassurance that debts will be paid. 24 Second, a uni-
form law would lessen litigation because potential litigants would
know if they had a valid claim prior to initiating an action.
A. Modification
Some lower Pennsylvania courts have approached this issue by
modifying the necessities doctrine." In modifying the doctrine,
these courts explicitly have rejected a simple extension of the
common law.'26 The result has been a gender neutral rule that
122. Geisinger Med. Ctr. v. Salerno, 40 Pa. D. & C.3d 668,669 (Montour Co. 1986). One
possible theory for the lack of appellate cases is that the monetary amount involved has not
yet been large enough to render an appeal economically feasible or practical.
123. See Hamot Med. Ctr. v. Fink, 6 Fiduciary Rep. 2d 302 (Crawford Co. 1986) (holding
husband's estate primarily liable, and widow secondarily liable, for medical care furnished
to husband); Park Ave. Hosp. v. Klees, 20 Pa. D. & C.3d 124 (Northumberland Co. 1981)
(holding each spouse primarily responsible for necessaries furnished himself or herself and
secondarily liable for those furnished to his or her marital partner). But see Nan Duskin v.
Parks, 11 Pa. D. & C.3d 299 (Phila. Co. 1978) (rejecting view that equality of the sexes can
be achieved under the mandate of the ERA by imposing an equal duty on the wife to pay
for the necessaries that may be supplied to her husband); Albert Einstein Med. Ctr. v.
Nathans, 27 Fiduciary Rep. 561 (Phila. Co. 1977) (holding that any modification of the
necessities doctrine should be made by the courts, not the legislature).
124. "[Clertainty of compensation will encourage present and potential providers of
necessaries to continue to render such benefits." Salerno, 40 Pa. D. & C.3d at 670.
125. See Harrisburg Med. Management v. Arnold, 44 Cumberland L.J. 379 (1995)
(holding that an extension of the doctrine of necessities that imposes the same rights and
burdens on both marital partners is consistent with the ERA); Fink, 6 Fiduciary Rep. 2d 302
(holding husband's estate primarily liable, and widow, secondarily liable, for medical care
furnished to husband); Landfair v. Balph, 21 Mercer Co. L.J. 278 (1985) (holding that spouse
to whom necessities were provided is primarily liable while the other spouse is secondarily
liable); Klees, 20 Pa. D. & C.3d 124 (holding each spouse primarily responsible for
necessaries furnished himself or herself and secondarily liable for those furnished his or her
marital partner).
126. In rejecting a simple extension of the doctrine, the Northumberland County Court
of Common Pleas stated:
The rule at common law was that the husband was primarily responsible for
necessaries furnished his wife. If we were to simplisticly extend this duty to
women, it would mean that each spouse is primarily responsible for the other,
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each spouse is primarily liable for necessaries furnished himself or
herself and is secondarily liable for those furnished to his or her
marital partner. 127  The premise of this rule rests on two princi-
ples: (1) it is in accordance with ERA cases decided in other areas
of domestic relations;" and (2) the doctrine of necessities was a
judicially created doctrine which should be changed only by the
courts.1
29
The first principle guiding the courts in its modification of the
doctrine is the mandate imposed by the ERA.13 An examination
of appellate court holdings under the ERA in related factual
situations led to the conclusion that "[a] practical and fair reading
of ERA is that it enhances the common law doctrine of necessaries
so that liability is not dependent upon the sex of the claimant."''
However, in modifying this right, courts have emphasized that they
are not "drop[ping] all concern for the non-earning members of a
marriage, be they men or women":
The common law rule was not so much that the husband must
pay because the wife could not, but that someone from the
financial unit must pay, and the husband was traditionally the
only one to qualify. The concern that someone must pay is just
as legitimate today as it was hundreds of years ago. When a
spouse is supplied with the necessaries of life, his or her marital
surely a nonsensical result.
Klees, 20 Pa. D. & C.3d at 130 (emphasis in original).
127. See Fink, 6 Fiduciary Rep. 2d 302; Salerno, 40 Pa. D. & C.3d 668; Landfair, 21
Mercer Co. L.J. 278; Klees, 20 Pa. D. & C.3d 124.
128. Those cases took common law rules based on sex and imposed similar reciprocal
rights and burdens on both sides. See discussion supra Part II.
129. Salerno, 40 Pa. D. & C.3d at 670. The court further explained:
[T]he "doctrine of necessaries" was a judicially created doctrine and has developed
by court action in the common law. The courts in applying this doctrine and in
crafting its suitable application over the years have not been enacting statutes, or
thwarting laws enacted by the legislature. Rather, the doctrine has been applied
by the courts in view of valid public-policy concerns bottomed upon changes in the
law and societal mores.
Id.
130. The Northumberland County Court of Common Pleas explained the effect of the
ERA on the doctrine of necessities as follows:
[B]ecause the common law was concerned with the ability of members of the
family to obtain necessary support, it looked to the husband who played the
dominant economic role in society. Today, because of the requirements of the
ERA we cannot continue to make this distinction, as it is based solely upon the
sex of those involved.
Klees, 20 Pa. D. & C.3d at 130.
131. Landfair, 21 Mercer Co. L.J. at 281.
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partner is also benefitted, and therefore, both ought to be liable
for them.132
In addition to the above reasoning, courts have also based their
modifications on the principle that a "marriage creates a single
financial unit."'33  The reasonable expectations of the marital
partners and their creditors are that each partner's income and
assets are held for the benefit of the marital partnership."t
Since the doctrine of necessities is a judicially created doctrine,
courts advocating a modification of the doctrine have been
adamant in their ability to do so. In Park Ave. Hosp. v. Klees,'35
the plaintiff-hospital sued for payment of services rendered to the
defendant-husband Richard A. Klees. The Court of Common Pleas
of Northumberland County denied preliminary objections asserting
that the joinder of defendant-wife Cora Klees constituted the
misjoinder of a party.'36 In its denial of the preliminary objec-
tions, the court stated:
[T]he challenge is to a common law doctrine which itself was
created by the courts, not by a legis-slature. There is no need
to be cautious of the legislature's prerogative in cases such as
these. Indeed, it is not even necessary to allege a constitutional
defect in the common law before a court can take the initiative
to alter it.'37
This stance is in direct opposition to decisions of other
Pennsylvania trial courts which have determined that any modifica-
tion of the doctrine is an "unnecessary and an unwarrantable
exercise of judicial power. '
B. Abolishment
Other Pennsylvania courts have determined that the abolish-
ment of the doctrine of necessities is in accordance with the Equal
Rights Amendment as well as the changing social conditions and
mores of our society.139 They view the doctrine as preserving a
132. Klees, 20 Pa. D. & C.3d at 130 (emphasis in original).
133. Fink, 6 Fiduciary Rep. 2d at 306.
134. Id.
135. 20 Pa. D. & C.3d 124 (Northumberland Co. 1981).
136. Id. at 125.
137. Id. at 128 (emphasis in original).
138. Nathans, 27 Fiduciary Rep. at 564.
139. See Beth Israel Med. Ctr. v. Sweet, 46 Pa. D. & C.3d 1 (Pike Co. 1986) (holding that
a married woman who neither requested that her husband receive medical treatment nor
1996]
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"relic of a bygone age."' ° Thus, in support of complete abolition
of the doctrine, these courts have relied on two guiding principles:
(1) the legislature is the more appropriate body to modify the
doctrine; and (2) equality of the sexes cannot be achieved by
imposing an equal duty on the wife to pay for necessities that may
be supplied to her husband.
141
The first principle is in direct contradiction to the opinion
endorsed by courts advocating a modification of the doctrine of
necessities. The courts that support abolition of the doctrine
recognize that in the course of the common law's "development
and application it undergoes changes and elaboration., 14 2 How-
ever, the extension of the doctrine endorsed by other courts consti-
tutes a "radical departure from the underlying reasons and implicit
assumption upon which the duties were based at common
law" .. 14 3  Consequently, the legislature-"who is not bound by
the strictures of precedent and not committed to the slower
methods of judicial elaboration"-should make the transition.'
44
Courts suggesting abolition have gone no further than to declare
the doctrine of necessities unconstitutional as repugnant to the
ERA. In so doing, the courts have warned that "[t]o adjudicate
beyond this point is to delve in an area of the law reserved to the
legislature, delve in speculation and dicta that is not necessary to
resolving the issue presented." '145 Thus, in facing a law that is
repugnant to the constitution, the "duty of the court is to strike it,
not to add provisions to it that will make it conform to the
constitutional provision. The latter function is legislative."'"
Advocates of the doctrine's abolishment believe it is possible
to strike down the offensive common law rule and at the same time
contracted for such treatment is not liable for her husband's debt); Nan Duskin v. Parks, 11
Pa. D. & C.3d 299 (Philadelphia Co. 1978) (rejecting the view that equality of the sexes can
be achieved under the mandate of the ERA by imposing an equal duty on the wives for
necessities that may be supplied to their husbands); Nathans, 27 Fiduciary Rep. 561 (holding
that allegation that necessities were furnished to defendant's wife is insufficient to sustain
assumpsit action against husband).
140. Nathans, 27 Fiduciary Rep. at 565.
141. Id. at 564.
142. Id. The court further stated that "[w]hen the same reason behind a common law
rule applied to a new situation, the courts were not diffident in elaborating on the old rule
to make it fit a new situation." Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 564.
145. Nathans, 27 Fiduciary Rep. at 567.
146. Id.
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implement the constitutional amendment mandating equality of the
sexes.147  In other words, the courts are repeating what the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held in Henderson v. Henderson
148
and Conway v. Dana149-that the duty to support can best be
determined by avoiding the artificial responsibilities and by looking
to the capacity of the parties. °50 These courts warn that to
impose the same common law duty on one of the parties to a
marriage is to make the marital relationship the test and basis for
liability.'51 Thus, the ERA's mandate of equality cannot be
achieved by burdening the wife with the legal duty to pay for
necessities supplied to her husband.
VI. Pennsylvania's Solution: Abolition
The purpose of the Equal Rights Amendment is clear: to
insure equality of rights and to eliminate sex as the basis for the
distinction of rights.'52 The changing conditions of society are
also clear. Women are growing more independent and, in many
cases, may no longer need protective legislation. These two
principles mandate a change in Pennsylvania's doctrine of necessi-
ties. However, the change advocated by the majority of
Pennsylvania courts, that the spouse who incurred the debt is
primarily liable and the nondebtor spouse secondarily liable, is a
misguided and unwarranted exercise of judicial power. The
solution, therefore, regarding the future of this archaic doctrine is
not modification, but abolition.
Two states, one a geographic neighbor of Pennsylvania, have
judicially abolished their common law doctrines of necessity.
Maryland and Virginia abolished the doctrine in Condore v. Prince
George's County,53 and in Schilling v. Bedford County Mem'l
Hosp.,15 respectively. Both states have Equal Rights Amend-
ments. 55 In both cases, the courts recognized the options avail-
147. Id. at 566.
148. 327 A.2d 60 (Pa. 1974).
149. 318 A.2d 324 (Pa. 1974).
150. Id.
151. Id.; Henderson v. Henderson, 327 A.2d 60 (Pa. 1974).
152. Id.
153. 425 A.2d 1011 (Md. 1981).
154. 303 S.E.2d 905 (Va. 1983).
155. MD. CONST., DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. 46; VA. CONST., art. I, § 11.
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able in terms of modification by extension.156 However, the
highest courts of both Maryland and Virginia have explicitly
rejected this option. Maryland's highest court, the Court of
Appeals, recognized that extending the common law would "create
a cause of action against a wife where none ha[d] previously
existed." '57 Pennsylvania, in using the ERA to extend rights and
duties in other areas, has also avoided creating a cause of action
where none previously existed."5 8 Thus, refusal to extend the
obligation of providing necessities bought by the husband for the
wife would be in accordance with the ERA.
Finally, both courts recognized that an extension of the
doctrine would have a significant effect on family life; consequently,
any modification should be instituted by the legislature.159 A
minority of Pennsylvania courts have also advocated for legislative
rather than judicial action.' 6° Legislative action is more appropri-
ate than judicial action given the broad range of modem marital
relationships. The legislature, as representatives with access to the
data of its constituency, is more attuned to the needs of
Pennsylvania citizens than the judiciary.
Although this Comment advocates the abolishment of the
doctrine, legislative action would be a better alternative than any
judicially created modification. However, a caveat must precede
any legislative action in that any statute enacted should specifically
state the terms of a spouse's liability. Otherwise confusion will still
exist regarding the extent of a spouse's liability.
156. Schilling, 303 S.E.2d at 908 ("The hospital urges us to extend the doctrine so it
applies to wives as well as husbands, rather than abolish it."); Condore, 425 A.2d at 1018
("The County urges that the ERA has itself modified and superseded the common law
doctrine as to necessaries by imposing upon the wife a reciprocal liability for necessaries
supplied to the husband.").
157. Condore, 425 A.2d at 1019. The court further explained that this rationale was in
keeping with other domestic relation areas affected by the ERA:
In Rand, we extended the common law rule as to support by a mother of her
minor children by making her equally responsible with the father to the extent of
her financial resources. We did not create a new cause of action against the
mother in Rand because, under the common law, she was secondarily liable for
child support, the father's obligation being the primary one.
Id.
158. See discussion supra Part II.
159. See Condore, 425 A.2d at 1019 ("Which best serves the societal need is, we think,
a matter of such fundamental policy that it should be determined by the legislature.");
Schilling, 303 S.E.2d at 908 ("[T]his task [of modification] if advisable, is better left to the
General Assembly.").
160. See supra note 138.
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For example, Virginia has subsequently modified its doctrine
of necessities by statute.161 However, problems have arisen
regarding statutory interpretation. Ambiguity arises because the
statute merely states that the doctrine of necessities is to be applied
to both males and females alike.162  Thus, the statute "leaves
unaddressed the specific nature and degree of liability to be borne
by each spouse for the cost of necessaries incurred by one
spouse."' i
Any modification of the doctrine of necessities fails to
recognize the multiplicity of modern marital support arrangements.
Any form of the doctrine of necessities, by defining spouses'
relationships with creditors, in effect establishes relatively inflexible
marital economic relationships. Pennsylvania courts that modify
the doctrine have boldly stated that "[a]s rights have been extended
by law, so must responsibilities be correspondingly extended.'
164
Such a statement is a generic pronouncement made with little
insight into the structuring of a modem day marital relationship.
Admittedly, more women are contributing to the household income
than have in the past. However, some wives and some husbands
remain economically dependent on their respective spouses. An
extension of the doctrine would ignore such relationships and place
liability on a spouse who arguably may not have an outside
income.165 Those who wish to structure their marital obligations
along traditional lines are therefore limited in their ability to do so.
Abolition of the doctrine would leave to individual couples the
161. Virginia's legislature has since modified its doctrine by adding the following
language to § 55-37 of the Virginia Code:
The doctrine of necessaries as it existed at common law shall apply equally to both
spouses, except where they are permanently living separate and apart... . No lien
arising out of a judgment under this section shall attach to the judgment debtors'
principal residence held by them as tenants by the entireties.
VA. CODE. ANN. § 55-37 (Michie 1995).
162. Brennan, supra note 84, at 325.
163. Id.
164. Geisinger Med. Ctr. v. Salerno, 40 Pa. D. & C.3d 668, 670 (Montour Co. 1986).
165. In Estate of Stromsted v. St. Michael Hosp. of Franciscan Sisters, 299 N.W.2d 226
(Wis. 1980), Justice Abrahamson, in his dissent, condemned the joint and several liability
approach stating:
The creditor's benefit may be attained at a substantial cost to the homemaker.
Under the majority's formulation, a full time homemaker who has supported the
family by contributing her services, who has little or no income or property, and
to whom the husband owes the duty to support, becomes, in effect, a guarantor
of payment for necessaries supplied to her husband, herself and the children.
Id. at 233 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
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definition and allocation of specific support duties within their
marriage.
Furthermore, in holding women liable for their husbands'
expenses, Pennsylvania courts provide no economic justification for
the imposition. The current economic position of women cannot
be characterized as strictly independent or dependent. While some
wives are economically independent,"6 for many married women
dependence is still a reality. If the current economic position of
women defies class-wide characterization, it makes little sense to
impose, through the necessities doctrine, a single characterization
upon all women.167 Instead, abolition of the doctrine would allow
women freedom to contract for or out of liability. Consequently,
an independent wife with significant financial means can accept
liability without hardship while a dependent wife can avoid the
hardship.
Courts that have modified the doctrine argue that such an
action protects creditors. However, there is no evidence that
creditors require more protection from married debtors than they
do from unmarried debtors. 6' In Jersey Shore Med. Ctr. v. Estate
of Baum,169 the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected independent
liability for married people with respect to their necessaries.70
The court believed that imposing such liability would "leave
creditors of a dependent spouse without recourse to the only
realistic source of payment, the financially independent
spouse."
171
This rationale was endorsed in Pennsylvania by the Court of
Common Pleas of Northumberland County.172 However, this
reasoning is misleading and unpersuasive. Creditors can avoid this
situation in at least two ways. First, a merchant does not have to
give credit. If the merchant thinks the buyer is a bad credit risk,
166. Over half of married women are employed outside the home. See U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, supra note 121, at 401.
167. Note, supra note 6, at 1778.
168. Id. at 1790.
169. 417 A.2d 1003 (N.J. 1980).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1009.
172. "The common law rule was not so much that the husband must pay because the wife
could not, but that someone from the financial unit must pay, and the husband was
traditionally the only one to qualify. The concern that someone must pay is just as legitimate
today as it was hundreds of years ago." Park Ave. Hosp. v. Klees, 20 Pa. D. & C.3d 124,130
(Northumberland Co. 1981) (emphasis in original).
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he can demand payment in cash.173 Second, creditors can treat
married debtors in the same manner as unmarried debtors by
limiting the "amount of individual credit to the debtor's indepen-
dent ability to repay.9
174
Abolition will not leave a "needy" spouse without a source of
financial protection. Scholars advocating abolition have posited
that, given the current absence of consensus regarding correct
marital roles, the most reasonable solution is to make the legal duty
to support a nonspecific one. This duty would consist of a simple
admonition to husbands and wives to financially and emotionally
support one another. This would allow individual couples to define
and allocate the specific support duties within their marriages.
175
An unenforceable duty to support does not undermine the duty's
efficacy. Quite the contrary, some unenforceable laws serve
symbolic functions; the effectiveness of symbolic laws depends on
public affirmation rather than legal enforcement. 176 "People obey
symbolic laws not for fear of legal sanction, but because they are
backed by the consensus of society and the force of major social
institutions., 177  Symbolic laws are quite possibly strongest in




The current trend in the Pennsylvania courts of modifying the
doctrine of necessities by placing primary liability on the debtor
spouse and secondary liability on the nondebtor spouse is an
attempt by the courts to preserve a "relic of a bygone age. 179
The complexity of modern marital relationships demands an
abolishment of any judicially created doctrine that attempts to
structure marital finances. Neither the doctrine's practical effects,
nor its premises, justify any existing modification. Moreover, the
Pennsylvania Equal Rights Amendment should not be used to
173. Note, supra note 6, at 1791.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1798.
176. Id. (citing Gusfield, Moral Passage: The Symbolic Passage in Public Designations of
Deviance, 15 Soc. PROBLEMS 175, 176-79 (1967)).
177. Id. at 1798.
178. Note, supra note 6, at 1798.
179. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr. v. Nathans, 27 Fiduciary Rep. 561, 565 (Philadelphia Co.
1977).
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create a new cause of action for women without first ascertaining
the economic reality or implications of such an action.
Judicial abolishment of any form of the doctrine of necessities
is the solution. Abolishment would accommodate the various
complexities of a marital relationship by recognizing the right of
married couples to structure their own finances. Abolishment
would also protect the property rights of the nondebtor spouse.
Finally, should any modification be implemented, it should be the
result of legislative, not judicial, action.
Elizabeth A. Heaney
